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Abstract
Background
Fear of negative evaluation (FNE) defines social anxiety yet the process of inferring social
evaluation, and its potential role in maintaining social anxiety, is poorly understood. We de-
veloped an instrumental learning task to model social evaluation learning, predicting that
FNE would specifically bias learning about the self but not others.
Methods
During six test blocks (3 self-referential, 3 other-referential), participants (n = 100) met six
personas and selected a word from a positive/negative pair to finish their social evaluation
sentences “I think [you are / George is]. . .”. Feedback contingencies corresponded to 3
rules, liked, neutral and disliked, with P[positive word correct] = 0.8, 0.5 and
0.2, respectively.
Results
As FNE increased participants selected fewer positive words (β = −0.4, 95% CI −0.7, −0.2,
p = 0.001), which was strongest in the self-referential condition (FNE × condition 0.28, 95%
CI 0.01, 0.54, p = 0.04), and the neutral and dislike rules (FNE × condition × rule, p = 0.07).
At low FNE the proportion of positive words selected for self-neutral and self-disliked greatly
exceeded the feedback contingency, indicating poor learning, which improved as
FNE increased.
Conclusions
FNE is associated with differences in processing social-evaluative information specifically
about the self. At low FNE this manifests as insensitivity to learning negative self-referential
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have asked that we request exemption from the open
data requirement on this basis. We are therefore
unable to provide an anonymised data set via the
supporting information files in this instance. However,
the data that form the basis of the results presented
in this paper are available on request from the
corresponding author, who may be contacted at the
evaluation. High FNE individuals are equally sensitive to learning positive or negative evalu-
ation, which although objectively more accurate, may have detrimental effects on
mental health.
Introduction
Fear of negative evaluation defines social anxiety [1] yet the cognitive processes involved in in-
ferring social evaluation are poorly understood [2,3]. Cognitive biases are thought to maintain
many psychiatric disorders, and while several areas of cognitive processing have been exten-
sively studied in social anxiety, few studies have examined the role of instrumental learning. So-
cial interactions are dynamic, with social behaviours contingent on evaluative feedback, which
in turn is inferred from ambiguous social cues. Understanding how individuals use accruing
cues to infer how others evaluate them may help to clarify the psychological mechanisms that
underlie social anxiety [4].
Research into simple associative processes suggests social anxiety is associated with a loss of
the positive associative bias observed in non-anxious controls [5–9]. However, none of these
studies has examined instrumental learning as it might occur during a social interaction where
the individual is inferring how the other social agent evaluates them using feedback. In a first
attempt to address this, we found that individuals low in social anxiety favoured inferring posi-
tive evaluation relative to negative evaluation, making substantially fewer errors learning ‘the
computer likes me’ than ‘the computer dislikes me’. This positive bias diminished as social anx-
iety increased driven by a decreased tendency to select words indicative of positive evaluation,
and an increased tendency to select words indicating negative evaluation [4]. However, in our
previous study we were unable to determine whether this effect was general to all social evalua-
tion learning or was specific to social evaluation learning about the self. This issue has impor-
tant clinical implications; treating a general bias requires a different approach to treating a
highly selective one.
According to dual-process models, automatic processes, such as, for example, implicit asso-
ciative learning which might occur in-situ during a social interaction, are functionally distinct
from the global reflective processes which might occur before or after a social interaction [10].
Both are implicated in maintaining social anxiety [11–13]. Socially anxious individuals tend to
conduct “post-mortems” after their social interactions, leading to a cycle of negative rumina-
tion [14,15]. In contrast, low anxious individuals tend to recall their past interactions with in-
creasing positivity [14]. Understanding how FNE might be related to learning social evaluation
in-the-moment during a social interaction may be important for understanding subsequent
global reflections.
The present study extends our previous work by examining whether the social evaluation
learning biases associated with FNE are specific to self-referential learning, and how they relate
to global interpretations. To this end we developed a novel probabilistic social evaluation learn-
ing task which required participants to learn three social rules (person is liked, person is neither
liked nor disliked, person is disliked) in both a self- and other-referential condition. Based on
the research outlined above we tested the following hypothesis: FNE is associated with de-
creased endorsement of positive [and thus increased endorsement of negative] social-evalua-
tive information, which is specific to learning about the self and not others.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited via email from a database of research volunteers. Interested individ-
uals completed a screening questionnaire including the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation
(BFNE) scale [16], and were eligible if aged 18–50 years, not currently receiving psychiatric
medication, and spoke English as a first language or near-equivalent standard. One-third of
participants were selected with BFNE scores in the lowest quartile (BFNE< 32), one-third
from the highest (BFNE> 45) and the rest at random from the mid-range. In total, 100 partici-
pants provided data for analysis (low BFNE, n = 33; Mid BFNE, n = 32; high BFNE, n = 35).
Ethics Statement
The study was conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki (2008) and Good Clinical
Practice guidelines, and was approved by the Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee at
the University of Bristol. Written consent was obtained from all participants. Participants were
recruited from February to June 2011, and did not consent to their data being made open. The
data that form the basis of the results presented here are available on request from the
corresponding author.
Materials
The social evaluation learning task used 64 word pairs comprised of semantically linked posi-
tive and negative words and selected from personality trait descriptors [17]. Positive and nega-
tive words were taken from words with above and below average likeableness ratings
respectively, and positive and negative words sets were balanced in terms meaningfulness, fa-
miliarity, and number of syllables and written language frequency [18]. The word pairs and
their selection are described in full elsewhere [4], but in brief, as far as possible word pairs con-
tained words that were semantically linked. The following are example word pairs, “generous,
selfish” and “polite, rude”.
Measures
The primary measure was the BFNE scale [16,19] comprising 12 items assessing beliefs about
negative evaluation, which are the core feature of social anxiety, rated on 5-point Likert-type
scales (1 = not at all characteristic of me; 5 = extremely characteristic of me). Higher scores in-
dicate greater fear of negative evaluation. Fear of negative evaluation is a defining characteristic
of social anxiety; however, FNE is not synonymous with social anxiety and tends to include a
wider range of individuals. We therefore included the companion Social Interaction Anxiety
and Social Phobia Scales (SIAS, SPS) [20], as measures of social anxiety to establish that the
BFNE scores provided a good proxy for social anxiety symptoms. FNE has been found to medi-
ate the association between measures of general distress and the SIAS and SPS [21]. Trait and
state anxiety were measured using the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory state (STAI-S)
and trait (STAI-T) sub-scales [22] and Visual Analogue Scales (VAS; 0 = lowest imaginable
level of anxiety; 100 = highest imaginable level of anxiety). To provide psychiatric diagnoses in
line with ICD-10 diagnostic categories [23,24], we also included questions pertaining to anxi-
ety, panic and phobia extracted from the revised Clinical Interview Schedule, (CIS-R) [25]. De-
pression was assessed using the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) [26], verbal IQ using
the National Adult Reading Test (NART) [27].
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
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Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were tested individually in the human testing
laboratories in the School of Social and Community Medicine, University of Bristol. A demo-
graphics questionnaire, the NART, and a VAS were completed prior to the social evaluation
learning task, which was programmed using E-Prime version 2.0 software (Psychology Soft-
ware Tools Inc., Pittsburgh PA, USA) and completed on a Toshiba Satellite Pro A300-1E7 lap-
top, Intel Pentium Core2Duo processor, with a 15.4 inch screen. Anxiety (BFNE, SIAS, SPS,
STAI-S, STAI-T, and VAS) and depression (PHQ-9) measures were completed after the task.
Participants were debriefed, given a chance to ask questions, and reimbursed £10 for their time
and travel.
Social evaluation learning task
The social evaluation learning task was based on probabilistic stimulus-reward learning tasks
[4,28], and adapted to incorporate pseudo social interactions. Before starting, the participants
were instructed by the experimenter that they would meet a series of six computer personas,
during six test blocks. Each persona required the participant to learn one of three social rules
(person is liked by persona, neutral, disliked by persona) in one of two conditions: self-referen-
tial (e.g., “persona likes me [participant]”), and other-referential (e.g., “persona likes George”).
Each persona block consisted of a learning phase, intended to simulate a social interaction, and
a global rating phase, intended to measure overall learning, providing a positive response rate
and global rating for analysis. In each block, the participants met a new computer persona who
presented them with a series of 32 positive/negative word pairs. For each block, the word pairs
were selected at random (without replacement) from the list of 64 word pairs. After introduc-
ing themselves, the personas instructed the participant to select the word in each pair that cor-
responded most with what they, the persona, thought about them, the participant (self-
referential), or a third person “George” (other-referential). In response to feedback as to wheth-
er their choice was correct, participants were instructed to use trial and error to learn whether
the personas liked or disliked them / “George”. The 32 word pair trials for the six personas
comprised the learning phases.
The feedback contingency for the three personas in each condition corresponded to three
different rules: like (positive word correct 80%), neutral (positive word correct 50%) and dislike
(positive word correct 20%). For the like rules the contingencies were implemented by setting
positive words as correct (and negative words as incorrect), and then assigning two in every 10
trials as “false feedback events” at random where the feedback is switched (this was achieved by
using a counter which re-set to zero after 10 trials). For example, a positive word choice would
be falsely reinforced as “incorrect” and a negative word as “correct”. For neutral, the same ap-
plied except for five out of every 10 trials the feedback is switched. For dislike, the negative
words were set as correct (and positive words as incorrect), with feedback falsely switched at
random for two in every 10 trials. At the end of each block the persona asked the participant
to provide a global rating of how much they thought the persona liked them (self-referential)
or “George” (other-referential) using a rating scale (0 = completely dislike through to
100 = completely like). These global ratings required the participants to reflect on their previ-
ous learning. An example of a test block indicating the nature of the pseudo-social interactions
is shown in Fig. 1.
Data Analysis
The study hypothesis was examined using random effects linear regression modelling (RRM)
in the statistical software package Stata 11 (StataCorp, 2009). RRM accounts for the correlation
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
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of residuals within individuals due to repeated measures. The outcome for the learning phase
was the percentage of positive responses, (n positive words/32) × 100. The outcome for global
ratings was percent ‘like’, 0 = completely dislike, 100 = completely like. The regression coeffi-
cients (β) for the analyses of both the learning phase and global rating (analysed in separate
models) represent the change in percent of positive responses for each unit increase in the
predictor variable.
Continuous BFNE score was used as the FNE predictor variable The main effects of FNE,
rule (like, neutral, dislike) and referential condition (self, other) on outcome were examined in
separate models for learning (percent positive responses) and global ratings. Rule was treated
as a categorical variable with three levels (like, neutral, dislike) with ‘like’ as the reference rule
andWald tests were used to test whether rule overall contributed significantly to the models.
To test our hypothesis that biased processing in FNE is specific to the self, and to examine how
this might vary by rule, we modelled percent positive responses (the learning outcome) as a
function of the three predictor variables (FNE, rule, referential condition) and their interaction
terms (FNE × referential condition, FNE × rule, and the FNE × referential condition × rule).
We then examined global ratings (outcome) as a function of FNE, rule, referential condition,
and their interaction terms FNE × referential condition, FNE × rule, and the FNE × referential
condition × rule. Finally, we conducted a simple linear regression to examine how well positive
response rate predicted global ratings.
Fig 1. Example of a self-referential rule block in the social evaluation learning task. Each block contains a probabilistic learning phase where 32 word
pairs and feedback are presented, and a global rating phase. There were 6 blocks in total, self-liked, self-neutral, self-disliked, other-liked, other-neutral,
other-disliked. P[positive word correct] = 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2, for the liked, neutral and disliked rules respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.g001
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
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To visualise the learning process we plotted the cumulative mean positive responses for the
32 trials for high and low FNE (median split of test-day BFNE scores, Fig. 2). To explore the
nature of any FNE-related differences in social-evaluative learning we examined how individu-
als adjusted their responses following feedback during the learning phases. We looked at cor-
rect-repeat behaviour for positive and negative words, that is how often individuals chose the
positive word, after being told their previous positive word choice was “correct”. We also
looked at incorrect-shift behaviour; that is, how often participants changed the valence of their
response after being told they were “incorrect”. To formally test whether FNE was related to
differences in these learning outcomes, and whether this varied according to referential condi-
tion, we modelled each of the learning outcomes (correct-repeat, incorrect-switch) as a func-
tion of FNE, referential condition, rule and the FNE by condition interaction separately for
positive and negative words using mixed-effects Poisson regression.
In a simple between-groups design a sample of 100 would have 80% power to detect an ef-
fect size d = 0.57 at an alpha level of 5%. The primary analysis in this study used BFNE scores
as a continuous variable, which increases power. However, testing the specified hypothesis re-
quires testing for interaction, which (depending on the size of the predicted interaction relative
to main effect) may decrease power [29]. Our primary hypothesis predicts that the differences
in social evalutation learning associated with BFNE will be specific to the self (BFNE ×
Condition).
Results
Characteristics of Participants
Descriptive data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. To illustrate the variability in data across the
sample the data are grouped according to BFNE screening groups. However, it should be noted
that all analyses treat FNE as continuous to maximise statistical power. The BFNE was admin-
istered at screening and test day, and showed good test re-test reliability, IIC 0.94 (95% CI 0.91,
0.96). The test day BFNE scores were used in the analyses.
The mean age of participants was 27 years (range 18–49 years). As expected, anxiety and de-
pression increased across the low, medium, and high socially anxious screening groups, as did
Fig 2. Cumulative mean positive responses over the 32 trials during the learning phase. Learning curves for high (n = 50) and low FNE (n = 50)
individuals based on median split of test-day BFNE scores. The high and low FNE groups vary most over the initial trials where high FNEmade fewer positive
responses. After the initial trials the high and low groups behave similarly except in the neutral and dislike rules in the self-referential condition where the
learning curves are clearly separated. The clear differentiation of the curves by rule indicates that individuals were adjusting their response in response
to feedback.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.g002
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
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the number of people who had previously received psychotherapy. Six individuals (17%) in the
high group, and one (3%) in the mid group, met the ICD-10 criteria for a diagnosis of social
phobia, and 35 individuals across the sample met previously defined clinical thresholds [30].
Participants across the three screening groups were similar concerning verbal IQ and in all
other respects.
Descriptive data
Table 2 shows the unadjusted mean positive response percentage and global rating scores for
each rule by referential condition by screening group. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative mean posi-
tive responses over the 32 learning trials for each of the rules and referential-condition for high
and low FNE. These curves clearly show that participants (on average) adjusted their behaviour
on a trial-by-trial basis to learn the rules. The high and low FNE groups seem to vary most over
the initial trials where the high FNE group made fewer positive responses. After the initial trials
the high and low groups behave similarly except in the neutral and dislike rules in the self-ref-
erential condition where the learning curves are clearly separated by high FNE individuals
maintaining lower cumulative mean positive responses across the 32 trials.
Regression
Linear regression modelling the main effects of BFNE, self-referential condition and rule on
positive responses found evidence of a main effect of BFNE (β = −0.17, 95% CI -0.32, -0.02,
p = 0.03), referential condition (β = −2.7, 95% CI -5.3, -0.1, p = 0.04), and rule (Wald χ2 [2] =
1142, p<0.001). Each 10-point increase on the BFNE scale corresponded with a 1.7% (95%
Table 1. Participant characteristics.
Low (n = 33) Mid (n = 32) High (n = 35)
M SD M SD M SD
Age 28 9 26 6 26 7
BFNE Screening 25 4 40 4 51 4
BFNE Test Day 25 6 43 5 50 4
STAI-state 29 8 40 10 44 9
STAI-trait 32 6 48 10 52 9
SPS 7 6 19 10 24 11
SIAS 11 7 27 10 33 14
PHQ-9 2 3 6 4 7 6
State Anxiety1 (pre-task) 13 14 30 19 39 21
State Anxiety1 (post-task) 15 12 23 15 39 20
NART 33 6 33 6 33 6
CIS-R Social Phobia: n (%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 6 (17%)
Female: n (%) 19 (58%) 21 (66%) 23 (66%)
Student: n (%) 19 (58%) 16 (50%) 19 (54%)
Ever prescribed antidepressants: n (%) 1 (3%) 3 (9%) 3 (9%)
Ever received cognitive therapy: n (%) 2 (6%) 8 (25%) 14 (40%)
Participants grouped by social anxiety based on quartile split of screening BFNE scores. BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale. STAI = State
Trait Anxiety Inventory. SPS = Social Phobia Scale. SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale. PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire. NART = National
Adult Reading Test. CIS-R = Clinical Interviews Schedule- Revised. AD = antidepressants.
1Assesed using a 0–100 visual analogue scale, with increasing score signalling increased state anxiety
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.t001
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CI 0.2%, 3.2%) decrease in positive responses, and participants endorsed 2.7% (95% CI 0.1%,
5.3%) more positive words when learning about themselves relative to others. Participants
showed strong discrimination between the rules suggesting that learning had occurred, with
the proportion of positive responses generally higher than the actual rule contingency for each
of the rules (Table 2).
Introducing the interactions of interest into the regression model for FNE found evidence
for the predicted BFNE × referential condition interaction (interaction term = 0.28, 95% CI
0.01, 0.54, p = 0.04); consistent with our hypothesis, BFNE was associated with social learning
specific to the self. At low FNE individuals made 9% more positive responses in the self-condi-
tion relative to the other-condition. According to the interaction term, each 10-point increase
in BFNE score corresponded to a 3 percentage point reduction in positive responses in the self-
condition. This is illustrated in Fig. 3; individuals with low FNE made more positive responses
in the self-referential condition relative to the other-referential condition, and positive re-
sponse rate decreased as a function of increasing FNE in the self-referential condition, while it
remained more constant in the other-referential condition. This essentially resulted in a reduc-
tion in self-favouring with increasing FNE. There was also evidence of a BFNE × rule interac-
tion (p = 0.002); increasing FNE was associated with a decreasing proportion of positive
responses mostly for the neutral and disliked rules (Table 3; Fig. 3). There was some evidence
that this decreasing positive response rate in the neutral and negative rules were strongest for
the self-referential condition; Fig. 3 shows the predicted linear relationship between each of the
six rule-conditions with FNE calculated using the lincom command in Stata. These linear
terms indicate that responses in the self-dislike rule (i.e., reference categories) varied most
with FNE (β = −0.42, 95% CI -0.67, -0.1.8), slightly less in the self-neutral rule (β = −0.35, 95%
Table 2. Mean positive response rate and global rating scores for referential condition and rule by screening group.
Task Condition Rule Low (n = 33) Mid (n = 32) High (n = 35)
M SD M SD M SD
Positive response ratea Self Like (80%) 82 15 89 10 85 10
Neutral (50%) 60 21 54 17 54 19
Dislike (20%) 33 22 27 21 24 26
Average (50%) 58 14 56 11 54 14
Other Like (80%) 78 14 81 16 82 17
Neutral (50%) 58 15 51 14 51 19
Dislike (20%) 30 17 23 15 28 17
Average (50%) 55 10 52 7 54 12
Global ratingb Self Like (80%) 73 21 75 14 70 16
Neutral (50%) 48 18 42 14 35 17
Dislike (20%) 29 23 18 16 17 18
Average (50%) 50 13 45 10 41 13
Other Like (80%) 72 18 75 18 72 17
Neutral (50%) 43 14 40 16 40 15
Dislike (20%) 25 21 24 15 22 16
Average (50%) 47 12 46 11 45 10
a (n positive responses/32)*100.
b 0 = complete Dislike, 100 = complete Like. Condition: Self = “persona [likes / neutral / dislikes] me”, Other = “persona [likes / neutral / dislikes] George”.
Rules: Like = 80% positive words correct, Neutral = 50% positive words correct, Dislike = 20% positive words correct.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.t002
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CI -0.59, -0.11), and did not vary with FNE in the self-positive rule (β = 0.04, 95% CI -0.20,
-0.29). However, the three-way BFNE × referential condition × rule interaction term did not
meet the criterion for statistical significance (p = 0.07; Table 3). The predicted values in Fig. 3
also suggest individuals with extreme low FNE were poor at learning the neutral and disliked
rules in the self-condition; their proportion of positive responses was about 10% greater relative
to the other-condition and about 20% greater than the actual rule contingency. As FNE in-
creased this positive self-referential bias was attenuated. The predicted positive responses for
those with highest FNE were similar to the actual rule contingencies suggesting that these indi-
viduals were accurate in learning across all rules. There was no evidence that the interaction of
interest (i.e., FNE × condition) was modulated by age or gender (FNE × condition × age = 0.00,
95% CI -0.01, 0.00, p = 0.33; FNE × condition × gender = −0.04, 95% CI -0.15, 0.07, p = 0.51).
Controlling for trait depression did not affect the results (coefficients remain the same as in
Table 3); controlling for anxiety slightly increased the effect of FNE in the reference self-dislike
condition (β = −0.5, 95% CI -0.8, -0.2, p = 0.003), but had no effect on the interaction terms
given in Table 3. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found similar results when we replaced
BFNE for other social anxiety variables, the SIAS and SPS (SIAS × condition β = 0.30, 95%
CI 0.04, 0.56; p = 0.02, SPS × condition β = 0.41, 95% CI 0.07, 0.75, p = 0.02).
Mixed effects Poisson regression indicated that FNE was associated with an increase in cor-
rect-repeat responses for negative words (rate ratio = 1.17, 95% CI 1.08, 1.26, p< 0.001), which
corresponds to a 17% increase in negative-correct-repeat behaviour for each standard deviation
increase in BFNE score (one standard deviation corresponds to 11.5 BFNE points). There was
also evidence for the interaction with referential condition (FNE × condition = 0.87, 95% CI
0.82, 0.93, p< 0.001) indicating that the increase in correct-repeat behaviour was specific to
the self-referential condition and not present in the other-referential condition (Fig. 4). There
was no evidence to suggest that positive-correct-repeat behaviour varied with FNE (rate
Fig 3. Predicted values for learning phase and global interpretations from regression models testing for differential effects of condition and rule
on FNE. BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. Rule contingencies like 80%, neutral 50%, dislike 20%. All regression models were a good fit for
the data, each explaining around 64% of overall variance for the learning phase, and around 60% for the global ratings. We predicted the linear relationship
between each rule and condition with social anxiety (coefficient and 95% confidence intervals) using the lincom command in Stata. These indicate that
learning in the self-referential condition and in the neutral and disliked rules is most associated with FNE, and this holds for both the learning and global
rating phases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.g003
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ratio = 0.96, 95% CI 0.91, 1.02, p = 0.20; FNE × condition = 1.02, 95% CI 0.96, 1.08, p = 0. 58).
Incorrect-switch behaviour was not related to FNE for positive words (rate ratio = 0.97, 95% CI
0.95, 1.12, p = 0.41; FNE × condition = 0.97, 95% CI 0.89, 1.07, p = 0.57) or negative words
(rate ratio = 0.97, 95% CI 0.90, 1.04, p = 0.40; FNE × condition = 1.04, 95% CI 0.95, 1.14,
p = 0.36).
Table 3. Regression coefficients (95%CI) from regression models testing for interactions of rule and self-referential condition with BFNE for the
positive response proportion and global ratings in the social learning task.
Response Rate Global Rating
Variable β 95% CI p β 95% CI p
BFNE −0.4 −0.7–0.2 0.001 −0.4 −0.7–0.2 0.001
Condition −9 −18 0.4 0.06 −9 −18–0.3 0.04
Rule <0.001 <0.001
Neutral 25 14 36 17 6 28
Like 39 28 50 37 26 48
BFNE × Condition 0.3 0.01 0.5 0.04 0.3 0.06 0.6 0.02
BFNE × Rule 0.002 0.03
BFNE × Neutral 0. 07 −0.2 0.3 0.06 −0.2 0.3
BFNE × Like 0. 5 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.6
BFNE × Rule × Condition −0.002 −0.005 2 ×10−4 0.07 −0.001 −0.004 0.001 0.4
BFNE = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale. Dislike is the reference rule, Self is the reference condition, therefore for every 1-point increase in BFNE
positive responses decrease by 0.4 in the self-dislike rule. p-values for variables with 3 levels based on Wald tests. Values < 1 reported to 1
signiﬁcant ﬁgure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.t003
Fig 4. Correct-repeat behaviour during the learning phase. Predicted values from the Poisson regression models testing for the referential-condition by
FNE interaction on correct-repeat behaviour during the learning phase in separate models for negative (left) and positive (right) words. We used the lincom
command in Stata to estimate the relationship (rate ratio and 95% confidence intervals) between correct-repeat behaviour and a one standard deviation
increase in BFNE (1 s.d. corresponds to 11.5 BFNE points) by referential condition. FNE was selectively associated with self-referential negative-correct-
repeat responses, with the coefficient indicating a 17% increase for each 11.5 point increase in BFNE, p< 0.001. There was no evidence to suggest that
negative-correct-repeat behaviour in the other other-referential condition, or that positive-correct-repeat behaviour in either condition, varied with FNE,
p’s> 0.2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456.g004
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Global Rating Phase
There was evidence of main effects of BFNE (β = −0.16, 95% CI -0.32, -0.01, p = 0.03), and rule
(Wald χ2 [2] = 999, p<0.001), but not self-referential condition (p = 0.5), on global ratings.
Similar to the learning responses rate each 10-point increase on the BFNE scale corresponded
with a 1.6% (95% CI 0.1%, 3.2%) decrease in like ratings. Participants’ global ratings showed
clear discrimination between the rules, further confirming that learning had occurred during
the learning phase (see Table 2 for means). Testing for interactions found evidence of the
hypothesised BFNE × referential condition interaction (interaction term = 0.31, 95% CI 0.06,
0.56, p = 0.02), and evidence of BFNE× rule interaction (Wald χ2 [2] = 7, p = 0.03), but no evi-
dence for the 3-way interaction (p = 0.4). Consistent with our hypothesis, increased FNE was
associated with decreased like ratings most strongly in the self-condition (Table 3; Fig. 3). Like
ratings also decreased most strongly in the neutral and negative rules, as indexed by the linear
terms presented in Fig. 3.
Responses during the learning phase were positively associated with the global ratings in a
simple regression, β = 0.74, 95% CI 0.69, 0.79, p< 0.001.
Discussion
As hypothesised, the results suggest that FNE was associated with differences in learning of so-
cial evaluation specifically about the self. On average, as FNE increased participants made
fewer positive (and thus more negative) responses in the self-condition. Less expected was the
(albeit weak) evidence that this self-referential effect was strongest for the neutral and disliked
rules. At low FNE, learning neutral and negative self-evaluation was particularly poor, and ac-
curacy in these rules increased with FNE. By contrast, learning positive evaluation was uni-
formly good at around 80% across all levels of FNE. Examining feedback learning behaviours
indicated that these FNE-related differences in social-evaluative learning arise primarily due to
differences in correct-repeat responses to negative words, suggesting that high FNE individuals
are more sensitive to feedback confirming negative word choices. A similar pattern of results
was observed for the global ratings, confirming that the positive contingencies were successful-
ly learned by participants.
Self-referential bias and self-favouring
Positive self-referential biases are thought to be protective for mental health (Taylor & Brown,
1994). In our sample, individuals from the lower half of the FNE distribution showed a positive
self-referential bias in two ways: first, their positive response rate exceeded that of the actual
self-neutral and self-dislike rule contingencies by some margin, suggesting they were overly
optimistic given the actual evidence, and; second, their positive response rate was substantially
higher in the self-condition relative to the other-condition. The selectivity of this optimistic
learning indicates that social evaluation learning per se is not biased by FNE, but that FNE acts
selectively on self-referential learning. Individuals with relatively low FNE seemed to disregard
feedback suggesting negative evaluation about the self. This would presumably increase confi-
dence during social interactions, produce better social outcomes, and reduce the availability of
negative information for later rumination. This may be one way a positive self-referential bias
may protect mental health. By contrast, individuals with high FNE learnt positive and negative
information more equally, indicating more accurate, but perhaps less healthy, social evaluation
learning. This has parallels with the loss of positive bias has been described in the “depressive
realism” literature [31,32].
Responses of low FNE individuals indicated that they inferred markedly more favourable
opinions of their own social evaluation relative to the other. By contrast at high FNE this
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self-favouring effect was abolished. Some theorists suggest that social anxiety behaviours may
have evolved as adaptive processes to maintain social hierarchy [33], and a loss of this self-fa-
vouring may contribute to a sense of social inferiority.
Positive, neutral, and negative evaluation
We have previously reported that low social anxiety individuals made substantially fewer errors
learning positive than negative evaluation, and that this positive bias diminished as social anxi-
ety increased [4]. Of note however, was that this effect seemed driven by similar changes in
both rules; decreased errors in the negative rule, which equated to fewer positive responses,
and increased errors in the positive rule which also equated to fewer positive responses (due to
the binary positive or negative word choice). In the present study, however, learning positive
evaluation was uniformly good and unrelated to FNE (Fig. 3). By contrast, we found that FNE
was most associated with learning neutral and negative self-evaluation (Figs. 2 and 3). As this
finding was not anticipated it should be considered as hypothesis-generating and thus requires
further replication before strong conclusions can be drawn. However, examining learning be-
haviour indicated that these selective rule effects were likely driven by differences in correct-re-
peat behaviour for self-negative (but not positive) words; at low FNE individual made very few
(~5) negative-correct-repeat behaviours, compared to their positive-correct-repeat behaviours
(~9), whereas at high FNE correct-repeat behaviours increased considerably for negative
words, whilst remaining relatively constant for positive words, resulting in similar numbers for
both negative and positive words (~8; Fig. 4). This effect was specific to self-referential words;
negative-correct updating in the other-referential condition did not vary with FNE (Fig. 4).
This suggests that FNE might be associated with differences in the weighting given to correct
feedback to negative self-referential words, with low FNE individual discounting or disregard-
ing such feedback so that they fail to update their belief about how much they are disliked. By
contrast high FNE individuals might weight such feedback similar to positive-correct feedback
and thus update their beliefs of how much they are liked and disliked more equally. This might
also explain why positive evaluation was unrelated to FNE; there are few opportunities for neg-
ative-correct-repeat behaviours. It also explains the dose-response relationship with neutral
and negative rules where the association with FNE increased as the probability of negative
words being correct increased. Further work is needed to examine these new hypotheses.
Global Reflections
Responses during the learning phase predicted global ratings, indicating that learning had oc-
curred. However, global ratings were lower than the respective positive response rates (Fig. 3).
This may reflect the influence of reflective appraisal in global interpretations, and lends support
to dual-process models [10]. Our findings may also help to integrate the seeming discrepancy
in the literature between “absence of positive” biases observed in learning paradigms [4–9] and
“negative biases” observed in more global interpretive paradigms [14,15]. Negative interpreta-
tions of social interactions are thought to increase social avoidance [34], and contribute to cy-
cles of negative rumination [14]. Consistent with previous research [35], we found that global
ratings were more negative (i.e., person rated as less liked) as FNE increased. At high levels of
FNE, ratings were lower than the true rule contingency, indicating unduly gloomy interpreta-
tions given the actual evidence, and this effect was strongest in the self-referential condition.
For high FNE, ratings in the self-condition were lower compared to the other-condition
(Fig. 2). Socially anxious individuals report feelings of social inferiority and low social status
[36]. The biases in social evaluation learning we describe could logically serve to maintain
such feelings.
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Clinical Implications
Our results provide support for the aspects of current cognitive therapies and cognitive models
which emphasise the role of FNE and self-schemata in maintaining symptoms [15]. Challeng-
ing an individual’s cognitions by switching the self-referential perspective to that of a third per-
son is a widely used technique in cognitive behavioural therapy and our results suggest this
should be particularly effective in social anxiety where FNE is high. However, in cognitive ther-
apy socially anxious people are helped to more realistically appraise situations, and often to
focus on signs of being liked. Our data suggest two things: first, that learning positive evalua-
tion (i.e., person is liked) was uniformly good and least related to social anxiety, and; second
that low anxious people are actually positively biased in relation to themselves. If our findings
generalise to real social interactions, and clinically ill groups, then they may suggest that en-
couraging socially anxious people to disengage from negative information and cultivate a posi-
tive interpretation bias may be therapeutic. Evidence for modifying positive interpretation
biases is preliminary [37] but our results suggest this as a possible avenue for treatment.
Research has indicated that people with social anxiety may feel threatened by positive social
feedback, possibly because it may mean that others will have higher expectations of them in the
future [38]. Furthermore, modern cognitive theories suggest that fear of positive evaluation is
also a core feature of social anxiety [39]. Our findings offer little support to this, as social anxi-
ety was least associated with differences when learning the liked rule. The differences were
strongest in the ambiguous neutral and disliked rules, where high social anxiety was associated
with greater sensitivity to learning negative evaluation indexed by increased negative-correct-
repeat behaviour.
Strengths and limitations
The main strength of this study is the innovative experimental design. Using this approach,
our study is the first to establish that the social evaluation learning biases associated with social
anxiety are more strongly related to self-referential information. The design is also a limitation;
the task was analogue and we cannot be sure that we are truly tapping a real social processing
effect, or whether the results may reflect a reporting bias. For example, individuals with high
FNE may feel embarrassed about selecting positive words, especially about themselves. Howev-
er, we can rule this form of bias out as all participants learnt the positive rule and this was least
related to FNE. Similarly, the extent to which participants felt socially engaged during the task
is unclear, and further research is needed to assess whether performance on this analogue task
taps processing which occurs in real social interactions. However, participants often respond to
interactions with computer personas in a similar manner to ‘real’ people, for example with
comparable negative feeling following ostracism [40].
A further limitation is the analogue sample. We cannot be sure how applicable the results
are to social anxiety and the clinical disorder. Nonetheless, while we focused on FNE, many of
our participants were highly symptomatic; seven met the ICD-10 criteria for social phobia di-
agnosis and 35 met previously defined clinical thresholds on social anxiety scales [30]. The de-
sign we adopted also reduces the possibility of introducing a selection bias that could happen
with case-control studies in which clinical cases are compared with people without the condi-
tion [41]. Further, modelling FNE as a continuous trait suggests a linear relationship between
FNE and social evaluation learning. This is consistent with the idea that social anxiety fears
and social anxiety disorder lie upon a continuum of severity [42].
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Conclusions
As FNE increased, learning negative social evaluation improved, that was specific to learning
about the self, and related to increased sensitivity to feedback indicating that negative self-refer-
ential endorsements were correct. These findings support cognitive models of social anxiety
that suggest activation of self-schema may bias social processing in favour of less positive con-
clusions [15]. During the learning phase high FNE individuals were more accurate than the
‘positively’ biased low FNE individuals. This raises the prospect that the absence of a ‘positive’
self-referential bias (potentially maintained by selective discounting of negative self-referential
feedback) may be a factor that increases the risk of social anxiety. If, as our evidence suggests,
social evaluation learning processes are biased by FNE and this contributes to social anxiety,
then treatment plans which address such learning may be clinically useful.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: KSB GL MRM. Performed the experiments: KSB.
Analyzed the data: KSB. Wrote the paper: KSB DK LS RMR GLMRM. Provided statistical ad-
vice: DK.
References
1. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders: DSM-5.
2. Amodio DM, Frith CD (2006) Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience 7: 268–277. PMID: 16552413
3. Frith CD, Frith U (1999) Cognitive psychology—Interacting minds—A biological basis. Science 286:
1692–1695. PMID: 10576727
4. Button KS, Browning M, Munafo MR, Lewis G (2012) Social inference and social anxiety: evidence of a
fear-congruent self-referential learning bias. J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry 43: 1082–1087. doi: 10.
1016/j.jbtep.2012.05.004 PMID: 22699043
5. de Jong PJ, de Graaf-Peters V, van Hout WJ, vanWees R (2009) Covariation bias for social events
and signs of (dis)approval in high and low socially anxious individuals. J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry
40: 359–373. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2009.02.001 PMID: 19268280
6. Garner M, Mogg K, Bradley BP (2006) Fear-relevant selective associations and social anxiety: absence
of a positive bias. Behav Res Ther 44: 201–217. PMID: 16389061
7. Hirsch C, Mathews A (1997) Interpretative inferences when reading about emotional events. Behav
Res Ther 35: 1123–1132. PMID: 9465445
8. Hirsch CR, Mathews A (2000) Impaired positive inferential bias in social phobia. J Abnorm Psychol
109: 705–712. PMID: 11195994
9. Hermann C, Ofer J, Flor H (2004) Covariation bias for ambiguous social stimuli in generalized social
phobia. J Abnorm Psychol 113: 646–653. PMID: 15535796
10. Strack F, Deutsch R (2004) Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. Pers Soc Psychol
Rev 8: 220–247. PMID: 15454347
11. Clark DM, McManus F (2002) Information processing in social phobia. Biol Psychiatry 51: 92–100.
PMID: 11801234
12. Glashouwer KA, de Jong PJ (2010) Disorder-specific automatic self-associations in depression and
anxiety: results of The Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety. Psychol Med 40: 1101–1111.
doi: 10.1017/S0033291709991371 PMID: 19811700
13. Glashouwer KA, de Jong PJ, Penninx BW (2011) Predictive validity of automatic self-associations for
the onset of anxiety disorders. J Abnorm Psychol 120: 607–616. doi: 10.1037/a0023205 PMID:
21500876
14. Abbott MJ, Rapee RM (2004) Post-event rumination and negative self-appraisal in social phobia before
and after treatment. J Abnorm Psychol 113: 136–144. PMID: 14992666
15. Clark DM, Wells G (1995) A cognitive model of social phobia. In: Heimberg RG, editor. Social phobia:
diagnosis, assessment and treatment. New York; London: Guilford Press. pp. 69–93.
16. Leary MR (1983) A Brief Version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. Personality and Social Psy-
chology Bulletin 9: 371–375.
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456 April 8, 2015 14 / 15
17. Anderson NH (1968) Likableness Ratings of 555 Personality-Trait Words. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 9: 272-&. PMID: 5666976
18. Kucera H, Francis WN (1967) Computational analysis of present-day American English. Providence:
Brown U.
19. Collins KA, Westra HA, Dozois DJA, Stewart SH (2005) The validity of the brief version of the Fear of
Negative Evaluation Scale. Journal of Anxiety Disorders 19: 345–359. PMID: 15686861
20. Mattick RP, Clarke JC (1998) Development and validation of measures of social phobia scrutiny fear
and social interaction anxiety. Behav Res Ther 36: 455–470. PMID: 9670605
21. Cox BJ, Swinson RP (1995) Assessment and Measurement In: Stein MB, editor. Social phobia: clinical
and research perspectives. Washington, D.C.; London: American Psychiatric Press. pp. 278.
22. Spielberger CD (1983) Manual for the state/trait anxiety inventory (form Y): (self evaluation question-
naire). Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press.
23. Weich S, Brugha T, King M, McManus S, Bebbington P, et al. (2011) Mental well-being and mental ill-
ness: findings from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey for England 2007. Br J Psychiatry 199: 23–
28. doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.111.091496 PMID: 21719878
24. World Health O (1992) International statistical classification of diseases and related health problems:
Geneva.
25. Lewis G, Pelosi AJ, Araya R, Dunn G (1992) Measuring psychiatric disorder in the community: a stan-
dardized assessment for use by lay interviewers. Psychological Medicine 22: 465–486. PMID: 1615114
26. Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, Williams JBW (2001) The PHQ-9—Validity of a brief depression severity mea-
sure. Journal of General Internal Medicine 16: 606–613. PMID: 11556941
27. Nelson HE (1982) National Adult Reading Test (NART):Test Manual. Windsor: NFER-NELSON.
28. Chamberlain SR, Muller U, Blackwell AD, Clark L, Robbins TW, et al. (2006) Neurochemical modulation
of response inhibition and probabilistic learning in humans. Science 311: 861–863. PMID: 16469930
29. Brookes ST, Whitley E, Peters TJ, Mulheran PA, Egger M, et al. (2001) Subgroup analyses in rando-
mised controlled trials: quantifying the risks of false-positives and false-negatives. Health Technology
Assessment 5: 1–56.
30. Brown EJ, Turovsky J, Heimberg RG, Juster HR, Brown TA, et al. (1997) Validation of the social inter-
action anxiety scale and the social phobia scale across the anxiety disorders. Psychological Assess-
ment 9: 21–27.
31. Taylor SE, Brown JD (1988) Illusion andWell-Being—a Social Psychological Perspective on Mental-
Health. Psychological Bulletin 103: 193–210. PMID: 3283814
32. Taylor SE, Brown JD (1994) Positive Illusions andWell-Being Revisited—Separating Fact from Fiction.
Psychological Bulletin 116: 21–27. PMID: 8078971
33. Gilbert P (2001) Evolution and social anxiety—The role of attraction, social competition, and social hier-
archies. Psychiatric Clinics of North America 24: 723-+. PMID: 11723630
34. Rapee RM, Heimberg RG (1997) A cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social phobia. Behaviour
Research and Therapy 35: 741–756. PMID: 9256517
35. Amin N, Foa EB, Coles ME (1998) Negative interpretation bias in social phobia. Behaviour Research
and Therapy 36: 945–957. PMID: 9714945
36. Weisman O, Aderka IM, Marom S, Hermesh H, Gilboa-Schechtman E (2011) Social rank and affiliation
in social anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy 49: 399–405. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2011.03.
010 PMID: 21497793
37. Salemink E, van den Hout M, Kindt M (2009) Effects of positive interpretive bias modification in highly
anxious individuals. J Anxiety Disord 23: 676–683. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2009.02.006 PMID: 19272750
38. Wallace ST, Alden LE (1997) Social phobia and positive social events: The price of success. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 106: 416–424. PMID: 9241943
39. Heimberg RG, Brozovich FA, Rapee RM (2010) A Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Social Anxiety Disor-
der: Update and Extension. In: Hofmann SG, DiBartolo PM, editors. Social anxiety: Clinical, develop-
mental, and social perspectives. New York: Elsevier.
40. Zadro L, Williams KD, Richardson R (2004) How low can you go? Ostracism by a computer is sufficient
to lower self-reported levels of belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 40: 560–567.
41. Schlesselman JJ, Stolley PD (1982) Case-control studies: design, conduct, analysis. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. xv, 354 p. p.
42. Miskovic V, Schmidt LA (2012) Social fearfulness in the human brain. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews 36: 459–478. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.08.002 PMID: 21855571
Social Evaluation Learning and Social Anxiety
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0119456 April 8, 2015 15 / 15
